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Abstract
The ability of physicians to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers of treatment implies that
even fully informed consumers of health care may receive treatments that they would
not themselves choose. This paper examines both the extent and direction of this
distortion away from patient choice  the physician agency e¤ect  using a large
patient-level claims-based data set for dental treatments under the British National
Health Service. We nd that an increase in competition between dentists results in an
increase in treatment e¤ort when those dentists are remunerated on a fee-for-service
basis, which is suggestive of stinting  physician agency resulting in under-treatment
relative to what patients would choose  and that this e¤ect is increases in the extent
to which patients are insulated form the cost of their treatment.
Keywords: Physician agency, incentives, insurance, stinting.
JEL Classication: I11
1 Introduction
As noted by Arrow (1963), one important characteristic of health care markets is
that physicians have more detailed information than their patients. McGuire (2000)
uses the term physician agency to denote the issues that arise out of this information
advantage and the market power that it generates. In essence physician agency im-
plies that the quantity and quality of health care that a physician delivers may di¤er
from those which a fully informed patient would choose conditional upon prevailing
prices, and evidence of this comes from an observed correlation between health care
delivery and physician specic variables, for example physician income or remuner-
ation method, after controlling for variations in the patients who are treated. If
the amount or quality of health care delivered changes according to a variable that
should only enter into the physicians welfare, and hence would not a¤ect a patients
choices, physician agency would appear to be at work. The most discussed evidence
of this type concerns the relationship between physician income and the utilisation
of health care services and has spawned a literature on the ability (or otherwise) of
physicians to manipulate the demand for their services  physician induced demand
Evans (1974).
As McGuire (2000) points out, estimates of the responsiveness of treatment to
physician income incorporate information about the rate of substituting between in-
come and other variables that enter physician utility functions, as well as information
about the extent to which physicians are able to adjust treatments. They do not
however, provide information as to whether physician agency results in patients being
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given more or less treatment than they would otherwise choose. And yet the direction
in which physician agency moves treatments away from fully informed patient choices
has important implications for policy because when patients are insulated from the
cost of the services that they receive, there is a tendency for over-consumption 
termed ex post moral hazard Zweifel & Manning (2000). Thus physician agency may
either mitigate or exacerbate consumer moral hazard problems.
The purpose of this paper is to examine both the extent and direction of physician
agency e¤ects in dental treatment in the British National Health Service (NHS). We
use a large patient-level claims-based panel data set for dental claims in Scotland
and estimate a model of treatment e¤ort expended by dentists. After controlling for
variations in patientsdental conditions and accounting for dentist specic (xed)
e¤ects, we nd evidence of physician agency which acts so as to reduce treatment
below that which patients, who in the British NHS are either partially or completely
insulated from cost, would otherwise choose  an outcome that Newhouse (2002)
refers to as stinting. Specically we nd that an increase in competition, as measured
by physician density causes a small increase in treatment e¤ort. In addition we nd
that the size of this e¤ect is dependent upon a number of characteristics of the area,
dentist and patient. First, we nd that agency e¤ect is greater when competition is
measured relative to a locality rather than a region. Second, we nd that the e¤ect
only applies to dentists who are paid on a fee-for service basis. Finally, we nd that
the extent of the agency e¤ect is dependent upon the insurance arrangement of the
patient and that fully insured patients receive a greater increase in treatment e¤ort
as a consequence of increased competition, than patients who contribute towards the
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cost of their treatment.
The theoretical background to our study is the literature on physician agency as
reviewed by McGuire (2000). Specically we take as our starting point a simple model
of monopolistic competition in which dentists are able to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers
on account of the nonretradable nature of health care. Since in the British NHS, as in
many health care systems prices for treatment are administered, we restrict attention
to a dentists o¤er of treatment e¤ort1 and assume that this is constrained because
patients have the ability to contact other dental service providers. Variations in the
tightness of this constraint provide us with a way of testing for both the existence
and direction of physician agency e¤ects.
The empirical background to this paper is the extensive literature dealing with
the relationship between physician specic variables and health service utilisation,
which is usually associated with testing the hypothesis of physician induced demand.
This literature has highlighted a fundamental identication problem  increased
health care utilisation may be due to either physician choice or attributable to pa-
tient preferences (or health care need). Resolving this identication problem has been
the concern of the most recent literature in the area. Identifying exogenous income
shocks in order to separate these competing explanations empirically has generated a
search for appropriate Instrumental Variables (see, for example, Grytten & Sørensen
(2001) and Sørensen & Grytten (1999)) despite the potential drawbacks of this ap-
proach as illustrated by Dranove & Wehner (1994).2 Gruber & Owings (1996), using
1We thus abstract from a dentists choices of quality of care, e¤orts to reduce costs or other
dimensions of choice that have been emphasised in associated literatures that deal with multi-tasking
aspects of physician behaviour, see, for example, Ma (1994).
2Dranove & Wehner (1994) cast doubt on the validity of some instruments employed to identify
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an apparently genuinely exogenous negative income shock  a reduction in fertil-
ity in the US  nd a small but signicant increases in Caesarean section delivery
rates. Given the coverage of fee-for-service remuneration systems for dental services,
dentistry has been a relatively fertile sector within which to test for the existence of
physician agency. The results have been generally supportive of the view that den-
tists pro-actively respond to exogenous income related shocks. For example, using
a two-part regression analysis to model the joint determination of attendance and
expenditure conditional upon attendance per patient Grytten et al. (1990) nd that
a measure of dentist density is positively related to both the probability of attendance
and expenditure. In a study of dentistry in the UK Birch (1988) shows that a suf-
cient, but not necessary, condition for demand inducement in a health care system
with xed fees is that there is a positive correlation between dentist density and the
amount of treatment per visit. Using data on the cost per course of treatment in each
of 98 primary health care districts in England for 1982 Birch (1988) nds support for
physician agency e¤ects.
In contrast to most existing studies we utilise data that provides detailed infor-
mation on both the treatments delivered, the patients to whom they are delivered
and the dentists who perform the treatment. We are thus able to control for the un-
observed dentist- and area-specic variables that may be correlated with utilisation
through a xed e¤ects regression model. Our empirical analysis is also uniquely set
within the framework of dental services in Scotland in which most dentists receive
PID by nding that an increase in the physician density of obstetrics and gynaecology physicians
led to an increase in the number of births.
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xed fee-for-service payments. Thus we concentrate on the e¤ect of an exogenous
increase in competition between dentists on the utilisation of dental services at the
intensive margin: the amount of treatment conditional upon attendance.
In section 2 we set out a simple theoretical model of the choice of treatment
intensity by dentists that serves to provide a framework within which to interpret our
empirical ndings. In section 3 we describe our data, set out our empirical model
and report the results of the xed e¤ects regression. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We consider a supplier of dental services, henceforth dentist, who is remunerated by a
single purchaser for delivering treatment to each of a given number3 of patients with
a specic dental condition over a specied duration of time.
We denote by e the treatment e¤ort that the dentist provides for each of their
patients. The payment that a dentist receives potentially varies according to the
number of patients treated, the e¤ort expended in treatment and upon the form of
the payment contract and we summarise these dependencies in a payment function
P (e): The predominant payment function that is used in the NHS is a fee-for-service
arrangement, in which P (e) reects the fact that more intensive treatments require
a greater number and variety procedures to be carried out, each of which is remuner-
ated. We assume that the dentist derives a net benet, b(e; p(e); z), from delivering
3We assume the number of patients treated is predetermined relative to the decision of how much
treatment e¤ort to o¤er. In practice, decisions about treatment e¤ort may impact upon the number
of patients that are available to be treated in future time periods, but for reasons of clarity we ignore
these inter-temporal aspects of treatment decisions and focus upon within period e¤ects.
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a treatment of e¤ort e; where z is a vector of exogenous variables impacting upon a
dentists utility. We assume that the function b(:) is di¤erentiable and concave in e.
The function b(:) captures the idea that a dentist may care about the dental well-
being of the patients that they treat so that whilst both monetary and non-monetary
(i.e. time) costs will be increasing in e, we admit the possibility that be > 0.
We assume that each patient derives a monetary equivalent benet from dental
treatment of B(e; x); where x is a vector of exogenous variables, such as, for example,
dental health status, income, age and gender which a¤ect an individuals utility. We
assume that B(:) is increasing and concave in e; and that the patient pays p(e) for
their treatment, where  denotes the co-insurance rate.4 Following McGuire (2000)
we suppose that the non-retradeable nature of health care means that patients regard
the o¤er of treatment made by the dentist as a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er and will refuse
treatment if the net benet B(e; x) p(e); is less than their reservation utility which
we denote U(y); where y is a vector of variables, such as the number of alternative
dentists, the degree of congestion in the dental services market and time and distance
costs that a¤ect the value of alternative o¤ers of treatment.
Central to the notion of physician agency is the possibility that the dentists
o¤er of treatment e¤ort does not conform to the patients informed choice, which in
the framework thus described will be denoted ep  argmax [B(e; x)  p(e)] with
resulting patient utility of Up  B(ep; x)  p(ep):
4In the UK NHS this co-insurance rate is equal to zero for some patients  those who are termed
exempt  but for the majority of patients, and the majority of treatments,  = 0:8. The patient
payment function, p(e); reects the cost of treatment received, which is evaluated in the British
NHS using the function P (e) as dened for the purpose of paying fee-for-service dentists. Thus even
when the patient is treated by a salaried dentist, the payment that they are required to make is the
same as if they had been treated under fee-for-service.
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b(e; P (e); z) subject to
B(e; x)  p(e)  U(y):
We consider three possible cases in the rst of which, the requirement of satisfying
the patient utility constraint is such that the dentist chooses ed = ep. In this case, the
physician acts as the perfect agent for the patient and there is no physician agency
issue. The observed choice of e¤ort, should in this case, reect only those variables
that impact upon the patients utility. Therefore, components of x should be observed
to have an impact upon e; but variables that enter exclusively into z should not have
an e¤ect. Since in this case patient utility is maximised, further improvements in the
vector y will not a¤ect the observed treatment e¤ort.
A second possibility is that the solution to the dentists programme involves setting
ed to satisfy B(ed; x)  p(ed) = U(y) but where the resulting utility is less than Up:
In this case there is a physician agency issue but the dentist is constrained by patient
welfare. Depending upon the functions b(:) and B(:) either ed > ep  which we
refer to as over-treatment  or ed < ep  which we refer to as under-treatment.
In both cases, changes in the vectors x and y should result in an observed change
in e: In the case of over-treatment any component of y that is associated with an
increase in consumer utility should reduce treatment e¤ort, and vice versa in the case
of under-treatment.
7
A third possibility is that is that a dentist can choose treatment e¤ort uncon-
strained by patient utility  we refer to this as unconstrained physician agency.
Because in this case ed satises be(ed; P (ed); z) = 0; neither x nor y should be observed
to a¤ect treatment e¤ort.
Which of these three cases prevails for a particular course of treatment with a
specic dentist will depend upon x; z; y and  and the functions B;P; p and U . How-
ever, there are a small number of dentists in the NHS who are remunerated on a xed
salary5 basis  these are dentists for whom P (e) = 0. These dentists are employed
in areas where there is a general shortage of fee-for-service practitioners and operate
under conditions in which there is little or no competition for patients. A priori there
is little reason to believe that the treatment decisions of xed salaried dentists will
respond to competitive pressures and, hence, they might be thought of as naturally
falling into the category of unconstrained physician agency
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data
The details of all NHS covered dental treatment in Scotland is collected by the Man-
agement Information and Dental Accounting System (MIDAS). This is a database
primarily used for paying dentists. The data collection process can be concisely de-
scribed as follows. When a dentist completes a course of NHS work, they submit
5Since a salary is paid irrespective of how many treatments are carried out, in a strict sense these
dentists have no concern as to whether their o¤ers of treatment are acceptable or not. However, in
practice the requirements of the employment contract and monitoring by the employer may force
such a concern.
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details of themselves, the patient and the treatment to a central payment system to
claim for payment. The claim for payment is validated through a series of checks to
avoid fraud. Once these checks are complete payment is made.
MIDAS covers all NHS courses of dental treatment over the last 10 years in 2000-
2001 there were about 4.1 million courses of NHS dental treatment provided. Each
practice, dentist, patient, course of treatment and individual treatment is allocated
a unique identier and it is therefore possible to follow patients, dentists, types of
treatment etc. over time. For the purposes of this exploratory analysis the data used
here are a simple random sample from this vast pool: data were extracted from claims
for patients whose identication number ended in the digits 001 for self-employed
dentists and 001, 002 or 003 for salaried dentists.
The data are organised as follows. Consider the treatment of a patient who
complains of a sore tooth that requires extraction. The dentist will design a treatment
plan for this patient which represents the treatment required for a specic complaint,
in this case a sore tooth. MIDAS calls this treatment plan a claim. Within each
claim the patient may receive a number of specic treatments: an examination, a
scale and polish, a radiograph, the extraction itself and so on. Each of these claim
treatments has a specic code (and fee) associated with it. These fees are determined
annually in a bilateral bargain between dentistsrepresentatives and health boards
and the menu of fees is set out in an annual publication: the Statement of Dental
Remuneration (SDR). While the level of fees has increased over time, the relative
fees for treatments have remained xed and based on the initial timings referred to
in Section 2. Hence, the total value of a claim provides an indication of the time that
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the dentist has spent treating a patient and we use the (log of the) real fee per claim,
ln(fee)6 to measure the treatment e¤ort of the dentist e.
Our data set contains 14053 useable claims. We have restricted the sample further
to include only those courses of treatment that require some activeintervention by
a dentist (approximately 75% of the full sample). The inactive treatments are
the empirical counterparts of treatments carried out at minimum intensity e. We
operationalise e by associating it with examination onlyclaims, scale and polish
onlyclaims and examination and scale and polish only claims. These seem to be
qualitatively di¤erent from the other treatments in the sample and are more likely
to be provided when there is little need for active intervention.7 Table 1 provides
descriptive statistics of these data.
The variables in Table 1 can be related to the theoretical model of Section 2
directly or indirectly. The dummy variables ddiag, dprev, dperio, dcons, dsurg,
dprosth, dorth and dother are based on the broad treatment categories dened in the
SDR and thus identify di¤erent types of dental condition which we can expect to be
reected in the functions b(:) and B(:) through the dentist and patient-specic vari-
ables, z and x, respectively. For example, dcons is a dummy variable which equals 1 if
the patient received any type of conservative treatment such as llings, for example
and 0 otherwise. Besides dental specic characteristics, we use standard patient
characteristics age and sex (and its square) as further proxies for di¤erent types of
patients. The exemption status of the patient, exempt, is the empirical counterpart of
6Adjusted to prices in 1999-2000
7Inducement may lead to more claims for inactive treatment. Our concern in this paper, however,
is dentistsadjustment to shocks at the intensive margin.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by contract
Variable Description Mean
Total number of active claims 10957
ln(fee) The log of the real fee per claim 3.43
ddiag Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a diagnosis
item
0.62
dprev Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a preventive
item
0.0001
dperio Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a periodontal
item
0.40
dcons Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a conservative
item
0.63
dsurg Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a surgical
item
0.15
dprosth Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a prosthetic
item
0.12
dorth Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an orthodontic
item
0.03
dother Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an other
item
0.16
page The age of the patient 37.68
dpsex The sex of the patient 0.44
exempt A dummy varible equal to 1 if the patient is exempt 0.37
npc The number of dentists per postcode area per year 7.97
nhb The number of dentists per health board area per year 118.17
comppc Population per dentist (by postcode area p.a.) 4711
comphb Population per dentist (by HB area p.a.) 4986
Note: The otherclaims constitute miscellaneous treatments not categorised elsewhere.
, the co-insurance rate. An exempt patient is fully insured against the cost of dental
treatment whilst a non-exempt patient is only partially insured. Conventionally, 
would be expected to impact on a dentists choice of e¤ort through the net benet
function of the patient: consistent with perfect agency. However, a reduction in 
leading to an increase in e¤ort is also consistent with constrained agency. Patients
may be exempt from payment of NHS dental charges for a number of reasons depend-
ing upon their individual circumstances including age, employment/income status or
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general health (e.g. pregnant and nursing mothers are exempt). Thus, in practice,
exempt, may be correlated with x and y.
The competition variables we use are annual population to dentist ratios calculated
at two levels of aggregation: health board, comphb, and postcode sector, comppc.
Table 1 illustrates that comppc provides a much more localised measure of competition
than the health board measure. For example, the average number of dentists in each
postcode sector is 8 per year compared with almost 118 at the level of the health
board. In the analysis of physician agency that follows we use both variables as the
empirical analogue of y.
3.2 Empirical Model
To address the fundamental concern that dentists may choose where to practice ac-
cording to their monetary and non-monetary costs and hence that dentist character-
istics are correlated with our measures of competition, comphb and comppc, we use
a xed e¤ects regression model. In order to control for variations in patient types
across dentists we include patient specic and treatment specic variables. Hence,
we estimate a model of the following form:
ln(fee)ij = compij + w
0
ij
 + j + i + "ij; (1)
where i and j denote the dentist and patient respectively. The variable compij
is one of the two competition controls, comphb and comppc, dened above. Given
the dependent variable is in log form, and the competition measure is dened as
12
the population to dentist ratio,  < 0 can be interpreted as the percentage increase
in the real fee associated with a unit increase in competition. We expect that the
local measure of competition, comppc, will be have a greater impact upon e than the
regional measure of competition, comphb. The matrix of additional patient controls,
wij, consists of the treatment categories, the exemption status of the patients and their
demographic characteristics. j are e¤ects included to control for periodic changes
to the nominal fee scale for dental services changes in p0 (e)8 and i denotes the
dentist-specic xed e¤ects.
3.3 Results
Table 2 presents the regression results from variants of Equation (1). Column (1)
represents the baseline regression specication with no controls for competition. From
column (1) we note that the controls for patients and their treatment are generally
signicant, with the exception of the sex of the patient. Exempt/fully insured patients
receive approximately 28% more treatment e¤ort than non-exempt patients.
Columns (2) and (3) introduce the Health Board and postcode level competition
measures, respectively. Column (2) indicates that competition measured at the health
board level has no e¤ect on the intensity of treatment per patient. In contrast, the
coe¢ cient on comppc in column (3) suggests dentists do respond to exogenous shifts,
albeit at a very small rate. Evaluated at the mean, the coe¢ cient suggests that a 1%
reduction in population per dentist (an increase in competition) increases the real fee
8The estimates from these dummies are not reported but are available from the authors upon
request.
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(treatment e¤ort) by 0.065%.
As noted in section 2 some dentists receive a xed salary and Column (4) therefore
replicates the regression in column (3) using 655 observations from 38 salaried dentists
in Scotland over the same period. We conjecture that the response to competition
e¤ect we observe in column (3) should not be present for salaried dentists, because
these dentists operate in areas where there is little or no alternative dental service
provision. Indeed, a signicant coe¢ cient on comppcmight suggest some specication
error in our regression formulation. However, as can be seen in Column 4 this variable
is not signicant for salaried dentists.
The theoretical analysis of Section 2 shows that the e¤ects of an increase in com-
petition, y, may di¤er according to the exemption status of the patient. Columns
(5) and (6) test this prediction by repeating the regression in column (3) for the
non-exempt and exempt sub-groups respectively. The results support the hypothe-
sis that the physician agency e¤ect is greater for exempt/fully insured patients than
for non-exempt/partially insured patients. Indeed, for the (approximately) 40% of
patients who are exempt/fully insured the elasticity of the competition variable is
approximately 0.094. In contrast, the e¤ect of an exogenous shock to competition
on the treatment of non-exempt patients is not signicant. This analysis therefore
uniquely tests for and nds a physician agency e¤ect operating through the insurance
contract of patients. Given NHS dental services operate within a set of administered
prices, this e¤ect cannot be interpreted as an increase in the fee (as in Gruber &
Owings (1996)) but, rather, as the e¤ort decisions of the dentist being a¤ected by a
binding demand constraint.
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The conguration of responses we observe in Table 2 provides evidence of which
physician agency regime NHS dentists operate within. In summary, we nd that
increased competition is associated with increased treatment e¤ort. This result is
consistent with both physician agency and under treatment of patients  stinting 
relative to the perfect agent e¤ort level ep.
4 Discussion
The idea that physicians can impose health care decisions on their patients  physi-
cian agency  is naturally a matter of continuing concern to health care policy-
makers. Two immediate issues are whether, in some particular context, physician
agency exists and whether as a consequence physicians provide too much or too little
treatment relative to what their patients would choose. Our ndings indicate both
that there is physician discretion in the choice of dental treatment in the British NHS
and that this discretion results in a reduction of treatment below that which patients
want  stinting.
Our focus has been on over- versus under-provision of treatment and we have
utilised the response of dentists to an exogenous variation in the extent of competition
to identify which of these two cases describes the data. We nd that the response of
treatment e¤ort to competition is positive and signicant. However, the magnitude of
our estimated coe¢ cients are such that competition cannot be regarded as a powerful
policy instrument for inuencing treatment e¤ort because the elasticity of e¤ort with
respect to the number of dental practitioners in an area is small. Nevertheless, the
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sign of this elasticity is important in understanding how physician agency operates. In
particular, it suggests that any policy that seeks to mitigate physician agency  for
example, by increasing patient choice  will potentially result in increased treatment
e¤ort and thus cost.
Our results also indicate that there is an important interdependency between the
decisions of physician agents and the insurance arrangements of their patients which
has potentially important implications for policy makers who are concerned with
mitigating the over-consumption of services where consumers are insulated from the
cost of treatment.
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(0.03491) (0.03491) (0.03564) (0.10337) (0.04727) (0.06403)
dorth 1.45348** 1.44962** 1.43524** 0.00000 0.99809 1.36858**
(0.08492) (0.08499) (0.08695) (0.00000) (0.96226) (0.09775)
dother 0.19088** 0.19175** 0.19011** -0.27688** 0.25728** 0.12920**
(0.02880) (0.02881) (0.02941) (0.10114) (0.04227) (0.04790)
exempt 0.25017** 0.24987** 0.24116** 0.08779  
(0.02313) (0.02313) (0.02362) (0.07200)
comphb  -0.00004    
(0.00003)
comppc  -0.000014* .0000218 -.0000116 -.0000199*
(5.69e-06) (.000027) (7.79e-06) (9.55e-06)
Constant 2.50216** 2.73273** 2.55400** 2.36117** 2.46873** 3.10167**
(0.11527) (0.23425) (0.12299) (0.29409) (0.15088) (0.23153)
Observations 8139 8139 7702 655 4656 3046
Number of did 1133 1133 1074 38 918 748
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.44 0.25 0.32
Standard errors in parentheses * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
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